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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

CAPRICE T. MARTIN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970501-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from an order revoking defendant's probation and executing the
sentence for robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301
(1995).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the 1996 probation extension
proceedings—including defendant's written request for an extension and his waiver of a
court appearance therefor—properly extended defendant's probation, thereby giving the

district court jurisdiction over later proceedings in which it revoked defendant's probation
and reinstated his original sentence.
Whether the trial court had the authority to extend defendant's probation is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness and given no particular deference.
State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah App. 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief,
including:
77-18-1.

Suspension of sentence - Pleas held in abeyance - Probation - Supervision Presentence investigation - Standards - Confidentiality - Terms and
conditions - Restitution - Termination, revocation, modification, or
extension - Hearings - Electronic monitoring.

(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having
been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation,
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the
hearing,
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation
or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
?

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to
believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified,
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing
and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him
if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the
affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf
and present evidence.
(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation,
the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the
entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 24, 1993, defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and aggravated
burglary, both first degree felonies (R. 8-10).1 On March 25, 1994, defendant pled guilty
to robbery, a second degree felony, and the remaining charge was dismissed (R. 41-43).
The trial court sentenced him to serve one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, stayed
the prison sentence, and placed him on two years' probation under various conditions,
commencing May 9, 1994 (R. 57-58).
Before the year was out, however, defendant violated his probation by committing
an act of domestic violence, using marijuana, and not taking substance abuse classes (R.
65-68).2 Adult Probation and Parole [AP&P] filed a Progress/Violation Report [Report]
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(b) (1995), and a supporting affidavit seeking
an order to show cause and a hearing (R. 67-68). Defendant and his counsel attended the
hearing on January 6, 1995, and defendant freely admitted three of the four violations
identified in the report (R. 72). The court revoked defendant's probation, then reinstated
it for an eighteen-month period ending July 6, 1996 (R. 72). Because of his marijuana

'The district court clerk did not paginate the individual pages of the hearing
transcripts for use in this appeal. Accordingly, citation herein to transcripts will be to the
volume number stamped on the cover of each transcript volume, followed by a colon and
the internal page number, i.e., R. 277: 7.
2

He also allegedly failed to obtain a G.E.D. (R. 65-66). However, at some point he
apparently obtained one (R. 72; 277: 8-9).
4

use, defendant was placed on an "intensive supervision program and electronic
monitoring*' for six months, then returned to normal probation in June 1995 (R. 75-77).
In May 1996, defendant's probation officer, Glade Anderson, arranged to meet
with defendant about his probation and the fact that it was about to expire with
uncompleted conditions (R. 277: 65-67).3 At the meeting, defendant was shown a
document entitled "Waiver of Personal Appearance Before the Court" [Request] (R. 277:
7-8) (a copy is attached in add. A). The request is a typed, one-page, double-spaced
document which requests an extension of probation, waives the need for a hearing before
the court, and notes that by signing it, defendant gives up his right to represent himself or
to have an attorney represent him at a hearing before the court (R. 82). Add. A. In the
middle of the page are four blank lines upon which is printed ""Probation extended 12
months from July 6, 1996 for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of
substance abuse counseling." (id.). Add. A. Mr. Anderson read the waiver form to
defendant, who showed no signs of having trouble understanding the document's
contents, and the two discussed defendant's failure to complete the substance abuse
classes and the need for an order-to-show-cause hearing on the point (R. 277: 7-9, 15-16).
Mr. Anderson informed defendant that the waiver was an alternative to having the
violations presented to the court at a hearing before a judge (R. 277: 8-9). The probation
3

Payment of a fine balance and completion of substance abuse counseling were
conditions of defendant's probation that defendant was not in a position to complete
before the July 6 expiration of his extension (R. 277: 9, 18).
5

officer believed that the extension would give defendant time to complete the conditions
of his probation instead of taking a chance that the outstanding conditions would result in
revocation of defendant's probation and reinstatement of his original sentence when the
July expiration date arrived (R. 277: 15, 18).
Mr. Anderson attached the request to his Progress/Violation Report and filed the
documents in court on May 28, 1996 (R. 80-82). (A copy of the Report is attached in
add. A.) The Report gave basic background information and, based on defendant's
request, recommended extension of the probation on the same terms defendant requested
in lieu of the usual order-to-show-cause hearing (R. 81). Add. A.
The last page of the Report provided an area for the judge to rule on the request as
follows: "approved and ordered'*; "denied*'; "date"; and "comments" (id.). Add. A. In
this instance, Judge Noel signed a line next to the words "approved and ordered** and
dated it the same day the document was filed (id.). Add. A. Defendant gave neither the
court nor his probation officer any reason to believe that he had reservations about his
waiver or did not fully understand it (R. 82; 277: 15-16).
Over the course of the twelve-month extension period, several other
Progress/Violation Reports and/or affidavits were filed on September 30, 1996;
December 6, 1996; January 17, 1997; and June 27, 1997 (R. 83-85, 97-98, 111-12, 11517, 242-45). These documents claimed numerous post-extension probation violations,
including: multiple assaults, domestic violence, terroristic threats, stalking, aggravated
6

escape, assault on a peace officer, burglary, failure to make timely restitution payments,
and failure to complete substance abuse classes (id.). After five post-extension order-toshow-cause hearings at which defendant admitted the majority of the violations (R. 91,
108, 134, 240, 242-45), the lower court revoked defendant's probation on June 30, 1997,
and imposed the original sentence of one-to-fifteen years in the state prison (R. 246-48).4
Defendant waited until March 12, 1997, to challenge the May 1996 written request
for extension and waiver as involuntary and unknowing (R. 148-69). He claimed that the
invalid waiver prevented a valid extension of his probation, thereby causing his probation
to expire on July 6, 1996, and leaving the court without jurisdiction to take any
subsequent action against him for probation violations (id.). By this time, all of the
probation violations alleged against defendant below had been committed, defendant had
been through several show cause hearings, and a final determination of the effect of the
violations on his probation had been continued numerous times (R. 83-85, 91, 93, 97-98.
108, 111, 134, 240). After defendant filed his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
the parties stipulated to disqualification of Judge Noel (R. 174-79), who recused himself
by order filed March 25, 1997 (R. 208). The case was thereafter assigned to Judge Leslie
A. Lewis, who denied defendant's motion to dismiss and ultimately revoked defendant's
probation, prompting this appeal (R. 227-38, 242-48; 277: 60-66).
defendant's admissions to aggravated escape and attempted assault on a peace
officer stemmed from his pleas of guilty to these charges in separate criminal proceedings
(R. 280: 4).
7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The original charges of burglary and robbery stem from defendant's active
participation with another man in the in-home burglary and robbery of five people at a
residence in South Salt Lake City, Utah, on May 20, 1993 (R. 9-10). The men entered the
home armed with an AK47 rifle and a knife, and defendant held both weapons on various
people at various times during the event (R. 9-10). He also threatened to kill at least one
victim while holding the rifle (R. 9-10). The evening's take consisted of $250.00, three
pagers, a purse, a package of hot dogs, some beer, and two check books (R. 10).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: Defendant is estopped from challenging the validity of the May 1996
extension of his probation and the district court's jurisdiction thereafter. Defendant's
submission of an extension request induced the State and the court to forego other valid
avenues for dealing with defendant's admitted violation of his probation. Further,
defendant thereafter acted in compliance with the grant of extension, making efforts to
comply with the probation conditions upon which the extension was based. Finally,
defendant repeatedly submitted himself to the district court's authority by attending
numerous post-extension show cause hearings and answering numerous allegations of
post-extension probation violations. Consequently, he cannot now challenge the district
court's authority over him.

8

Point II: Should this Court reach defendant's claims, it will find them to be
without merit. Defendant's claim of entitlement to the same due process protections in
his extension proceedings as is afforded probationers in revocation proceedings is without
support. While probation revocation proceedings involve minimal due process
protections, probation extension proceedings are entitled to even less because they
involve a significantly less "grievous" loss. Utah law provides the same due process
protections in both situations, but, in keeping with the lesser degree of loss involved in
extension proceedings, provides for voluntary extension proceedings whereby a
probationer may waive his right to a hearing and the attendant procedures and voluntarily
request an extension of his probation. This statute comports with federal directives, and
its application to defendant does not violate his due process rights.
Contrary to defendant's claim, his request was knowing, and the procedures
followed were sufficient to effect an extension of his probation. Defendant's claim that
his waiver was not knowing or voluntary is belied by the record evidence. The district
court found, and the record supports, that defendant had prior, first-hand experience with
probation violations and extension proceedings, he discussed the situation in a meeting
with his probation officer, he knew and understood the content of both the request he
executed and AP&P's violation report, and he was '"an intelligent, capable and reasoned*'
individual. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that his request was knowing.

9

Finally, the documentation used to extend defendant's probation was sufficient to
accomplish the extension. No formal motion is required by the extension statute, but
even if it were, defendant's written request would meet the requirement. The district
court's signature at the end of AP&P's report granting the extension is not invalidated
merely because of the absence of a separate caption, and the absence of findings relating
to the extension request does not undermine the court's approval of the request.
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION TO THE LOWER COURT'S AUTHORITY
AFTER PRE-EXPIRATION APPROVAL OF HIS REQUEST, AND HIS
ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL PROBATION VIOLATIONS DURING THE
EXTENSION PERIOD ESTOPS HIM FROM CHALLENGING THE COURT'S
ACTIONS ON APPEAL
A.

Introduction
Defendant appeals from an order entered June 30, 1997, in which the lower court

revoked probation and reinstated his original prison sentence following his admissions to
multiple probation violations (R. 246-48). This order was the last in a series of orders
stretching over the three years defendant spent on probation. (A chronology of the
procedural facts in this case is attached as add. B.)
Defendant does not deny that there was good cause for the July 1997 revocation of
his probation. His appellate claims focus on an earlier period during his probation when
the district court extended his probation from July 6, 1996, to July 6, 1997, based on
defendant's written request for an extension and waiver of a show cause hearing to obtain
10

time to comply with the conditions of his probation.5 Add. B. Defendant claims, in
general, that the probation was not properly extended, that it therefore expired on July 6,
1996, and that the district court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation and
reinstate his prison sentence nearly a year later.6
By challenging his request for a probation extension, defendant tries to mold the
interpretation of Utah's probation extension statute to his benefit. After having used the
statute to his benefit by initiating voluntary extension proceedings to avoid the possibility
of revocation of his probation for this second series of violations (Utah Code Ann. § 775

Defendant has never denied that he was in violation of his probation when it was
extended in May of 1996, and defendant received exactly what he sought from the district
court: extension of his probation for only so long as defendant requested under the same
conditions existing when the request was executed (R. 81-82).
6

The tolling statute alone justifies the district court's actions subsequent to July 6,
1996. Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (Supp. 1996), the running of defendant's
probation period was tolled on May 28, 1998, when the Report was filed alleging two
probation violations (a copy of the statute is attached in add. C). Because the district
court granted the extension based on defendant's written waiver, invalidation of the
waiver as defendant argues would render the court's order invalid and leave the report's
allegations without disposition. Consequently, defendant's probation would necessarily
remain tolled beyond the July 6 expiration date, giving the district court authority to
undertake its subsequent actions involving defendant's probation. Cf People v. Laws,
558 N.E.2d 638, 640-42 (111. App.) (probation was tolled between filing of petition
alleging probation violations and disposition of the allegations; once probation period was
tolled, the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke probation based on a violation occurring
after the date the original probation was to end), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 844 (111.
1990); Perry v. Indiana, 642 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. App. 1994) (probation was tolled between
filing of petition alleging violations and disposition of the allegations; a probationer
remains subject to the conditions of his probation during the time the probation period is
statutorily tolled; hence, defendant was properly subjected to revocation of his probation
for a violation occurring on the last day of the tolled period).
11

18-1(10) (Supp. 1996)), defendant wants this Court to interpret the law in such a way as
to permit him to escape the subsequent likelihood of revocation and imprisonment which
arose because of numerous post-waiver probation violations. However, defendant's
interpretation fails because: 1) his actions below estop him from obtaining the benefit he
seeks; 2) the elevated due process rights defendant claims for himself are inapplicable to
voluntary probation extension proceedings; and 3) the procedures utilized below were
sufficient to permit a timely, valid extension of defendant's probation.7
B.

Defendant Is Estopped From Challenging The Propriety Of The Extension By
Having Requesting The Extension, Attempting To Comply With The Extension,
And Subsequently Appearing Before The Court To Answer Charges Of PostExtension Probation Violations
"[E]stoppel bars a party when by acts, or silence, one induces another party to act

to his detriment in reliance on that silence or act." Lone Mountain Prod. Co. v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., 984 F.2d 1551, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992). That it applies in post-trial
probation proceedings is widely recognized. See State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481,
483 (Iowa 1993) (probation extension proceedings); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 942
S.W.2d 289, 292 (Ky. 1997) (probation extension proceedings); see also In re Griffin, 62
Cal.Rptr. 6, 431 P.2d 625, 628-30 (Cal. 1967) (probation revocation proceedings); cf

7

The State has reorganized the arguments presented by defendant, but refers the
reader to the appropriate part of defendant's brief for each point, where appropriate. The
State's Point I, however, does not correspond to any argument presented in defendant's
brief.
12

Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) (noting that parole revocation
proceedings are civil in nature). The Kentucky Supreme Court recently held:
Even if the trial court lacked [personal] jurisdiction [because the statutory
probationary period had run], [the defendant] is estopped from challenging the
court's exercise of that jurisdiction. [He] voluntarily requested the . . . extension of
his probationary period, and he then accepted the benefits of the court's granting of
the request (i.e., he avoided incarceration). As the former Court of Appeals noted,
~[w]here the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, statements made for the
purpose of giving the court [personal] jurisdiction, after they have been acted on,
cannot be withdrawn or contradicted by the party making them for the purpose of
taking away such jurisdiction/'
Griffin. 942 S.W.2d at 292 (citing Duncan v. O'Nan. 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky. 1970)).
Defendant's brief overlooks the fact that by his own act of obtaining the extension
before expiration of his probation period, he prevented the court and the State from acting
in any other appropriate manner by which they could have properly dealt with
defendant's violations. Relying on defendant's May 21, 1996, extension request, neither
the State nor the district court pursued an order to show cause or a hearing-legitimate
avenues otherwise open to them under section 77-18-1(12). Defendant also ignores the
fact that he acted in compliance with the court's approval of his extension request by
making payments, albeit irregular, toward the fines and restitution imposed under his
probation conditions and by completing the substance abuse classes within five months of
executing the extension request (R. 83, 85, 99). Finally, defendant repeatedly submitted
himself to the district court's authority by appearing at multiple show cause hearings for
post-extension probation violations and admitting or denying each allegation (R. 91, 108,
13

134, 240, 242-45). Given defendant's actions in failing to withdraw his timely request for
an extension before it was granted, and by continuing to submit himself to the district
court's authority, defendant is now estopped from challenging the proceedings below.
POINT II
ELEVATED DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS DO NOT APPLY TO
VOLUNTARY PROBATION EXTENSION PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY
DEFENDANT, AND DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF
HIS PROBATION AND WAIVER OF A HEARING WAS EFFECTIVE UNDER
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 77-18-l(12)(A)(l)
A.

Only Minimal Due Process Protections Apply To Voluntary Probation Extension
Proceedings. And Those Protections May Be Waived
While defendant contends that his federal constitutional due process rights were

violated by the extension proceedings in this case8 (Br. of Aplt. at 26-34), it should be
noted that the extension in this case took place in keeping with the requirements of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(l) (Supp. 1996). Add. C. Thus, defendant's claim appears
to be more of an assertion that the application of the statute violates his due process
rights.

8

This is defendant's fourth claim of error on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 26-34.
However, because a determination of the appropriate level of due process rights
applicable to probation extension proceedings is a prerequisite to deciding the validity of
the proceedings used, the State addresses the due process argument at this point of its
responsive brief. Because defendant does not include a separate argument under the state
constitution, this Court need address only the federal constitutional claim he asserts.
State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 n.l (Utah 1996).
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Defendant argues that the procedures for extending probation should be identical
to those for revoking probation because he holds a "liberty interest'' equal to or greater
than that of a probationer facing revocation of his probation. Br. of Aplt. at 27-29.9
However, because defendant is not entitled to elevated due process rights in probation
extension proceedings and the statute's application was appropriate, his argument is
without merit.
Proceedings which occur after a defendant is convicted are "not part of a criminal
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does
not apply." Morrissev v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972). "Due
process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation
demands/' State v. Byington. 936 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations
omitted). Hence, the level of due process protection differs in a contested criminal trial
and in subsequent proceedings to revoke, extend or modify probation. See id. at 1116
(recognizing differing levels of due process rights applicable pre- and post-conviction);
see also Skipworth v. United States. 508 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1975) (the standard of due
process requirements for parole revocations does not necessarily apply to parole
extensions).
Q

Defendant also argues that the procedural rights afforded by Utah's statute "create
an expectation" which gives rise to constitutional due process rights. Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1(12). However, the plain language of the statute limits any "expectation" of due
process rights because it plainly provides for use of a waiver as an alternative to
exercising those rights, as was done in this case. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12): Add. C.
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The requirement of due process ''depends on the extent to which an individual will
be condemned to suffer grievous loss." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S. Ct. at 2600;
Skipworth, 508 F.2d at 601. In the case of probation revocation, a probationer is
deprived "not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special... restrictions." Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973) (quoting Morrissev. 408 U.S.
at 480, 92 S. Ct. at 2600). Further, probation revocation proceedings carry with them
"minimum" due process protections because the procedural rights and potential
detriments involved in such proceedings do not generally warrant the same protections as
do the constitutional rights involved in contested criminal trials.10 Bvington, 936 P.2d at
1116 (citations omitted); see also Morrissev. 408 U.S. at 489-90, 92 S. Ct. at 2604.
Unlike a criminal defendant facing trial, who enjoys the full range of due process
protections, a probationer has a "more limited due process right" because he or she has
already been convicted of a crime. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789, 93 S. Ct. at 1763. In
contrast to the guilt and penalty phases of a trial, revocation proceedings involve only a
10

The minimum due process requirements in revocation proceedings include: a
preliminary hearing; a hearing for the revocation; written notice of the claimed violations;
disclosure to the defendant of evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person
and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses; a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional
parole board; and a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for the revocation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489-90, 92 S. Ct. at 2604 (addressing a
parole situation). These rights are generally encompassed for involuntary revocation and
extension proceedings in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12).
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determination of whether the probationer violated probation, and whether probation
should be revoked. Morrissey. 408 U.S. at 479-80, 92 S. Ct. at 2599.
It is widely acknowledged that probationers facing extension proceedings are
entitled to even more limited due process requirements than those facing revocation
proceedings. See Skipworth. 508 F.2d 598 (holding that fairness requires minimum due
process protections, but no hearing for probation extension situations); United States v.
CornwelL 625 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir.) ("The nature of the interest and the loss resulting
from extension simply do not parallel the fundamental nature of the interest or the
seriousness of the loss involved in [probation revocation situations]"), cert, denied, 449
U.S. 1066, 101 S. Ct. 794 (1980); United States v. Carey. 565 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir.
1977) (extension of probation does not implicate a liberty interest sufficient to
constitutionally require a pre-extension hearing), cert, denied. 435 U.S. 953, 98 S. Ct.
1582 (1978). As the court in Skipworth explained:
[A]n extension of probation is clearly not as "grievous" a "loss" as revocation, and
here it entailed no greater restrictions than those which existed previously. In fact,
the primary "loss" suffered by an individual whose probation has been extended
lies not in the continuing restrictions themselves, but in the possibility of future
revocation. While such a loss is indeed serious it is merely potential at the time of
extension, and the due process clause clearly provided the protection of a hearing
in the event that revocation proceedings should subsequently occur.
Skipworth. 508 F.2d at 601-02.11
11

Whether defendant is entitled to any due process protections at all in these
circumstances is far from clear. He was admittedly in violation of his probation, and he
requested the extension to avoid a revocation hearing and the possibility of revocation of
17

Because of the different liberty interest at stake, the due process procedures
applicable to probation revocation do not strictly apply to probation extension. State v.
Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1995); accord State v. Zeiszler. 19 Ohio
App.3d 138, 141, 483 N.E.2d 493, 497 (1984) ("The due process procedures required in
probation revocation hearings need not be strictly complied with in cases involving
extensions or modifications"); State v. Jones. 60 Ohio App.2d 178, 396 N.E.2d 244
(1978) ("The due process procedures required in probation revocation hearings need not
be employed in court actions which extend the time one must remain on probation"); see
also Forgues v. United States. 636 F.2d 1125, 1127 (6th Cir. 1980) (no prior notice or
hearing is constitutionally required to extend probation)..
Further, the United States Supreme Court has imparted a degree of flexibility in
due process determinations which allows lower courts and state legislatures to determine
what rights to extend to probationers in probation proceedings, so long as minimum
requirements are met. See Gagnon. 411 U.S. at 788, 93 S. Ct. at 1763 (refusing to extend
probationers' due process rights to include a requirement of counsel at all probation
revocation hearings, leaving the determination to be made by states on an ad hoc basis);
see also Byington, 936 P.2d at 1115-16.

his probation. The State found no cases involving a similarly-w orded probation statute,
similar facts, and a due process discussion, and defendant cites none.
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Utah has statutorily provided probationers with the same procedural requirements
for revoking or involuntarily extending probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). Add.
C. However, the plain language of the statute grants probationers the alternative of
voluntarily extending probation by waiving the need for a show cause hearing and the
requirements associated with it, thereby avoiding the possibility of having their probation
revoked at the hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a); cf. Stephens v. Bonneville
Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997) (when interpreting a statute, the court looks to the
plain language of the statute and reads each word literally, unless to do so renders the
statute unreasonably confused or inoperable); State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1190
(Utah App. 1995) (appellate courts look first to the plain language of a statute to interpret
its meaning). This statute is in keeping with the United States Supreme Court's directives
(Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788, 93 S. Ct. at 1763), and recognizes the more "grievous loss"
faced in revocation proceedings by failing to provide for the waiver alternative in that
instance. Application of this statute, therefore, does not violate defendant's due process
rights. While he may be granted under statutory law the same due process protections
applicable to probation revocation proceedings, his exercise of his statutory right to
voluntary extension proceedings—actively requesting an extension and waiving a hearing-legitimately surrenders those rights. So long as defendant's request was proper, his
claim of error in failing to receive the same due process considerations imposed in
probation revocation proceedings is without merit.
19

B.

The Evidence Demonstrates That Defendant Executed A Proper And Knowing
Waiver
Throughout his brief, defendant argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily

waive his right to a hearing and to the accompanying procedural rights outlined in section
77-18-1(12) for involuntary probation extension. Br. of Aplt. at 11-15, 22-25, 33-34. His
argument is comprised of two basic parts. First, he claims an entitlement to notice of the
extension proceedings and a hearing before his waiver can be deemed proper. Id. at 2225. Defendant ignores the fact, however, that he met with his probation officer and
executed a written request himself for an extension of his probation (R. 5-7, 29-30, 82).
Hence, even assuming a notice requirement, it was amply met here. Further, due process
does not generally entail a right to a separate hearing on the voluntariness of a waiver.
See United States v. Chambliss, 766 F.2d 1520, 1521-22 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
Cf Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e): State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313-14 (Utah 1987)
(hearing required before guilty plea may be accepted). Indeed, defendant's application of
notice and hearing requirements to this situation would require the lower court to hold a
hearing in order to extend probation "upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer'. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). Such an argument robs the language of subsection
(12)(a)(i) of its plain meaning.12
,:

Defendant's reliance on State v. Rawlings as requiring notice and adequate time
to address the issues before the July 6 expiration date (Br. of Aplt. at 22-23) is misplaced.
Rawlings dealt with involuntary extension proceedings commenced by the State and was
based on subsection (10)(c), which has since been deleted from the statute. Rawlings,
20

Second, defendant claims, without citing any supporting authority, that before his
waiver can be deemed knowing and voluntary, he must first be expressly advised that by
executing the waiver, he is forfeiting each of those statutory rights. Br. of Aplt. at 11-15.
However, the extensive, thorough disclosure assumed by defendant is not appropriate in
voluntary probation extension proceedings at which minimal, if any, due process
protection applies. State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1994) ("Almost
without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied
only to those rights which the constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to
preserve a fair trial/*) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237, 93 S. Ct.
2041. 2052-53 (1973)). Indeed, the "knowing and intelligent" standard has only been
required to waive those rights "that guarantee the defendant a fair trial and protect the
reliability of the truth-determining process." Id (quoting United States v. Lawson, 736
F.2d835, 839(2 nd Cir. 1984)).
Here, we are faced with statutory due process rights which generally warrant less
protection than their constitutional counterparts. Byington. 936 P.2d at 1116. It is
unclear what lesser level of disclosure, if any, is required before a probationer who is
admittedly out of compliance with his probation conditions can request an extension of
time to come into compliance. However, even under Rawlings' standard that a waiver of

893 P.2d at 1067; Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996).
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due process rights in involuntary extension proceedings must be knowing, defendant's
waiver is proper.
In his first point, defendant challenges his waiver by attacking two of the trial
court's findings of fact, which include the lower court's determination that defendant's
waiver was knowingly executed by defendant. Br. of Aplt. at 11-15. Specifically,
defendant claims that paragraphs 9 and 10 of the trial court's written findings are without
any record support and, hence, are clearly erroneous. Id.
Paragraphs 9 and 10 provide:
9. On May 21, 1996. Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause
proceeding would be initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of
Personal Appearance, knew that at an Order to Show Cause proceeding he would
be entitled [to] all due process and access to counsel rights available to criminal
defendants, knew that he would have the right to admit or deny any allegations of
such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he would be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing at which the State would have to show, upon the evidence, to a
preponderance standard, that a probation violation had occurred, and he knew that
his probation could be revoked and his original prison sentence entered if a
violation was found.
10. On May 21, 1996, Defendant signed the Waiver of Personal
Appearance form freely and voluntarily, knowing that as a result his probation
would be extended for an additional twelve months.
(R. 229-30) (copies of the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Order, and verbal ruling on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, are attached in add. D).13
13

At no point below did defendant preserve the challenge to these findings which
he presents on appeal. Neither does he assert that the challenge was preserved. Thus, the
claim is not properly before this Court on appeal. See Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d
356, 361 (Utah 1990) (failure to timely object to or move to amend or make additional
22

Findings of fact from a trial court are viewed on appeal under a clearly erroneous
standard, which requires that the findings be against the clear weight of the evidence
before error is found. State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant argues that, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing below, he
could not have executed the waiver knowingly because he was never expressly told of the
rights he was waiving. Br. of Aplt. at 12-15. However, defendant's challenge wholly
ignores the fact that the record contains additional information, noted and relied upon by
the district court judge in rendering her ruling.
Finding number eight, which is not challenged by defendant, establishes a large
part of the basis for the lower court's finding of knowledge:
8. Having previously been subject to an Order to Show Cause proceeding
on January 6, 1995, Defendant was fully cognizant of the possibility of his having
an Order to Show Cause filed against him for failing to abide by and complete his
probationary conditions, and was fully aware of the rights, and risks, entailed in an
order to show cause proceeding.
(R. 229). Add. D. During the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, the
trial court remarked that it took judicial notice of the information in the court's file on this
case relating to the first order to show cause proceedings against defendant (R. 277: 62).
Add. D. The court went on to note that, based on these prior proceedings, defendant

findings waived an appellate challenge to the findings). However, because elsewhere in
his brief, defendant permissibly challenges the validity of the waiver itself (Br. of Aplt. at
22-25, 33-34), the State reviews the findings as part of its response to defendant's
remaining challenges to the waiver.
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understood the option of an order to show cause hearing and his right to it (R. 277: 63).
Add. D.
Judicial notice is a substitute for the taking of evidence, and the trial court has
discretion to sua sponte take judicial notice of appropriate things. Utah R. Evid. 201(c);
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Taking judicial notice of the records and prior proceedings
in the same case is wholly appropriate. Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App.
1989); see also In re S.J.. 576 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1978).
The record in this case clearly establishes that defendant was, in fact, subjected to
an earlier order to show cause proceeding based on multiple alleged violations of the
probation originally imposed in this case (R. 65-68, 72). Add. B. As with the instant
extension proceeding, the former proceeding arose in part from defendant's failure to
complete the substance abuse classes required by his probation conditions (R. 65-68).14
Defendant enjoyed the full panoply of statutory rights which accompanies an allegation of
probation violation: a Progress/Violation Report and an affidavit were filed (R. 65-68); a
bench warrant was issued (R. 59), and an order to show cause hearing was held at which
defendant appeared with counsel, participated in his defense, admitted some of the
violations, denied others, and had his probation revoked and reinstated (R. 72).
14

The former proceedings also involved defendant's use of marijuana three months
after being placed on probation, and his abuse of his former girlfriend four months later
(R. 67-68).
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In addition to this previous experience, defendant had obtained his G.E.D. (R. 277:
9) and had no trouble reading or understanding English (R. 277: 9, 31-32). The district
court judge found that defendant's testimony and in-court demeanor demonstrated him to
be "an intelligent, capable and reasoned high school graduate, fully cognizant, and
demonstrably able to read, write and understand the English language." (R. 228-30).
Add. D. The one-page, double-spaced waiver form was short, simple, and
straightforward, and it unambiguously informed defendant of his right to an attorney or to
self-representation at a hearing in lieu of signing the waiver (R. 82). Add. A. It also
identified, in one, clear, obvious, printed sentence in the middle of the otherwise typewritten form, the goal of and the basis for the waiver: "Probation extended 12 months
from July 6, 1996 for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of substance
abuse counseling" (id.). Add. A. While defendant claims not to have read the waiver,
his probation officer testified that he read it out loud to defendant and discussed with
defendant the need for substance abuse classes (R. 277: 7-8, 15, 31). The two also
discussed an order to show cause hearing, and the officer explained to defendant that the
document waived his need to personally appear before the court (R. 8).
This record evidence supports the lower court's findings in paragraph 9 that, on
May 21, 1996, defendant knew that because of the two violations plainly noted on the
waiver form: he was facing a show7 cause proceeding; he would have a right to counsel
and to a full evidentiary hearing at which the violations would be admitted, denied or
25

proved; and he would be facing the possibility of revocation of his probation and
imposition of his original sentence. More importantly, it reflects defendant's reasonable
understanding of the proceedings as well as his awareness of the rights involved therein.
See Byington, 936 P.2d 1117 (discussing the standard applicable to a waiver of a
statutory right to counsel). Finally, it supports the lower court's determination in
paragraph 10 that defendant executed the waiver freely and voluntarily, although such a
finding is not necessary to a determination of the validity of the waiver. See id (statutory
rights generally do not warrant the same protections as do constitutional rights).
Accordingly, defendant's request and waiver was knowing, and the trial court correctly
determined that the waiver was proper.
C

The Documentation Used Below Was Sufficient To Extend Defendant's Probation
In point two of his brief, defendant contends that no valid motion or order to

extend his probation was ever filed. Br. of Aplt. at 15-18. Specifically, he argues that
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 requires the filing of a motion before entry of a valid
order extending probation, that a motion to extend probation may be filed only by
someone authorized to practice law, and that the Progress/Violation Report filed by a
probation officer as part of his reporting requirements under the law does not constitute a
valid motion. Ld at 16-18. Consequently, he argues, his probation was never legally
extended, but expired on July 6, 1996, as scheduled, leaving the lower court without
jurisdiction to revoke his probation and to impose his original prison sentence nearly a
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year later. Id. at 18. However, his claim is without merit as the documents filed in this
case were sufficient to properly extend defendant's probation.
Section 77-18-1 does not contemplate use of a formal written motion before
probation may be extended. The statute merely notes that defendant may elect to waive a
hearing and extend his probation in lieu of participating in a full hearing. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i). Add. C. Defendant submitted a proper request for extension
and waiver of hearing, which clearly identified his desire to avoid a hearing and extend
his probation without further delay. Defendant's probation officer supported defendant's
position and, by filing the Report, met his statutory duty to inform the prosecutor and the
court of the case status. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(b). Add. C. On this record, the
general purpose behind use of a motion was satisfied—all were aware of the issue before
the court and had an opportunity for input-and nothing more formal was required.
Even if a motion requirement is imposed upon a waiver under section 77-18l(12)(a)(i), it was met in this case by defendant's written waiver. In it, defendant
"requested]"* not only that his personal appearance before the court be waived, but that
his "probation supervision be extended" (R. 82). Add. A. The document states "with
particularity the grounds upon which it is made and . . . the relief sought" from the court.
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(a). In support of the request, defendant's probation officer submitted
a report providing additional factual information, and echoing the grounds and relief
identified in defendant's request (R. 80-81). Add. A. Contrary to defendant's
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assumption, nothing in the statute suggests that a motion must take the form of an Order
to Show Cause before it will be recognized in probation proceedings. Br. of Aplt. at 1718. Consequently, defendant himself met the motion requirement.
Defendant also faults the district court's approval of the extension request, arguing
that the initials placed next to the words "approved and ordered'' at the end of the
violation report, together with the date it was signed by the judge, do not constitute a
valid order because: 1) it was not entered pursuant to a valid motion; 2) the report itself is
merely a report, not an order; and 3) there are no findings of fact on the record resolving
any factual issues.1:> Br. of Aplt. at 17-18. First, as established above, the court's
approval was entered pursuant to defendant's request and waiver, which satisfied the
motion requirement, if any.
Second, the placement of the court's signature at the end of AP&P's report does
not mean that the court's approval of the extension request and waiver does not constitute
an enforceable order. It should be treated no differently than if it were a separate
15

The copy of the Report executed by Judge Noel below was sent to AP&P, while
the copy retained in the court's file has a date and conformed signature done by the clerk
at Judge Noel's direction (R. 277: 17, 22, 25-26). Defendant does not challenge the order
retained by the lower court as being invalid because it contains only the district judge's
initials in lieu of his signature, as he did below (R. 153). Accordingly, the issue is not
before this Court on appeal. Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 n.4 (Utah 1992)
(where an appellant fails to brief an issue to the appellate court, the issue is waived); State
v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (absent an argument as specified by rule
24(a)(9), the appellate court will not reach an issue). Moreover, the original document,
which was signed by the district court judge, was used below in the evidentiary hearing,
and is included in the record as State's Exhibit 1 (R. 277: 17). Add. A.
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document such as is routinely drafted and submitted by parties for a court's signature. It
may be brief, but it is clear and unambiguous in its meaning: defendant's extension
request is approved, and probation is extended twelve months for the reasons set forth in
defendant's request and echoed in the Report. The absence of a separate caption should
not render the court's decision ineffectual.
Finally, the absence of findings of fact relating to the request does not define the
nature of the court's approval. Br. of App. at 17. Such findings are not mandatory, and
their absence merely suggests that there were no factual issues involved in determining
defendant's request. Indeed, defendant identifies no findings which should have been
entered, but merely notes that none appear on the record. Id
Accordingly, there is no defect in the documentation by which defendant's
probation was extended, and defendant's claim to the contrary is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
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ADDENDUM A
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f LEASE RETURN THiS COPY TO:
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
275 Ec st 200 South, 3rd Floor
Salt L2.V.b City, Utah 941^1

STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT

TO:

Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, Utah

REGARDING: MARTIN, CAPRICE

ATTN: Judge Frank G. Noel

CASE NO.: 93-1900803

FROM: Field Operations/Region III

OFFENSE: Robbery, Second Degree
Felony

DATE: May 16, 1996

OBSCIS: 00076845

PROBATION DATE: May 9, 19 94

ADDRESS: 3408 South 300 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah

DEFENSE ATTY: David L. Sanders

EMPLOYMENT: Swanson, S.L.C., Utah

COMMENTS: The defendant was placed on probation for 24 months by your
Honor and was ordered to complete all standard conditions of probation in
addition to the following special conditions:
1.

Serve one year in the Salt Lake County Jail with credit for time
served;

2.

Pay a fine in the amount of $1,850.00;

3.

Pay restitution in an amount to be determined by Adult Probation
and Parole;

4.

Enter, participate in and complete substance abuse program;

5.

Obtain G.E.D. or high school graduation;

6.

Complete ISP supervision;

7.

Not associate with gang members;

8.

Testify honestly in trial as described by the State of Utah.
*
(
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^
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PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT
RE: MARTIN, CAPRICE
PAGE TWO

The defendant has reported to Adult Probation and Parole monthly and has
completed all of the conditions of probation with the exception of
completing his fine and verification of substance abuse counseling. The
defendant's probation will terminate on July 6, 1996.

IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AGENT:

NOTIFY COURT AND SUPERVISOR.

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended that the defendant's
probation be extended for an additional 12 months from July 6, 1996. This
will allow Adult Probation and Parole to retain jurisdiction of the
defendant for the verification of substance abuse counseling and fine
payments. The defendant has agreed to this and has signed a Waiver of
Personal Appearance before your Honor.
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PATRICIA DENNIS, SUPERVISOR
Region III Probation

gy//id^/Jtir^

/

GLADE ANDERSON, PROBATION OFFICER

APPROVED AND ORDERED:
DENIED:
DATE:

*D

COMMENTS:

g:\parole\susan\martin.pgv
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State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
FIELD OPERATIONS
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
O. Lane McCotter
Ray Wahl

I

REGION III
275 East 200 South. Suite 100
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111

Director. Field Operations

I

(801)533-4984

Executive Director

WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE
BEFORE THE COURT

'a* ant, fff^>
i <*jr

Date

Caprice
BSCIS #_

, Court Case #

do hereby voluntarily request that my personal

npearance before the

Court be waived and

hat my probation supervision be extended; AND/OR that the conditions of my
robation be amended as follows:
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realize that by signing this Waiver I will not be able to represent myself
>r have an attorney represent me before the Court; however, I am willing to
^cept the extension of my probation AND/OR the above-noted amendment to the
:ouditions of my probation, as stipulated to by the Court and voluntarily
/aive my right of personal appearance before the Court in this matter.
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ADDENDUM B

CHRONOLOGY
FIRST VIOLATION:
Probation originally imposed (R. 57-58)
Bench warrant issued (R. 59)
Violation affidavit filed (R. 65-66)
(dom abuse; no GED; classes unfinished; mj)
& Progress/Violation Report filed (R. 67-68)
OSC hearing (R. 72)
(admits, probation revoked/reinstated to 7/6/96)

5/9/94
12/19/94
12/20/94

4- 1/6/95

SECOND VIOLATION:
Meeting w/Glade & def; waiver signed (R. 82)

5/21/96

Prog/viol rptfiled/ctsigns order (R. 80-82)

5/28/96

DEFENDANT ALLEGES
PROBATION EXPIRED

7/6/96

THIRD VIOLATION:
Prog/viol rpt & affid filed (R. 83-85)
(irreg restitution pmts; classes unfinished;
assault; not kept reported address)

-I-- 9/30/96

Bench warrant issued (R. 86)

10/17/96

OSC hearing (R. 91)
(admitted, viol found, disposition cont'd)

10/25/96

D's Motion to Continue OSC (R. 92-93)
(wants agg burg/assault charges decided before
probation issue)

-- 10/31/96

FOURTH VIOLATION:
Amended afiid filed & bench war issued
(2 assaults; irreg pmt; dom viol) (R. 97-98,103)
OSC hearing
(denies, disposition set for 1/31) (R. 108)

4 - 12/6/96
4~ 12/13/96

FIFTH VIOLATION:
Def threatens estranged wife; arrested for agg escape,
assault on peace officer, stalking, terroristic
threats(R. I l l )

4 - 1/14/97

Prog/viol rpt filed w/affid (S. Morgan) (R.111-2,115-7)
(bench warrant issues—R. 113)

4-- 1/17/97

OSC; rinding prob cause of viol; OSC hng set (R. 124)
(w/amended affid of viol by Kim Jensen - R. 125-33)

- 4 - 1/30/97

OSC hearing (R. 134)
(denies, disposition cont'd to 2/28)

4-- 1/31/97

D's mot to continue OSC (R. 143-5)

- 4 - 2/26/97

CHALLENGE TO SECOND VIOLATION:
D's motion to dismiss (R. 148-69)

3/12/97

Stipulated Motion to Disqualify J. Noel (R. 174-79)
& order recusing self (R. 208)

3/25/97

Judge Lewis conducts evid hng on motion to dismiss (R. 222)
Findings/Conclusions/Order (R. 227-38)

5/8/97
5/20/97

FINAL DISPOSITION OF VIOLATIONS 3-5:
Disposition hng on prior OSC (R.240) ~|« 6/6/97
(admits violations from 9/30/96 affid & OSC; I
probation revoked) I
Def pled guilty to escape & assault on peace officer
(R.280:4)

-J— 6/13/97
I

2d amended affid filed &finaldisposition hng held -I-- 6/27/97
(admits, violation found, probat revoked, I
sentence reinstated) (R. 242-45) I
J/m, sentence, commitment (R. 246-48) ~|~ 6/30/97
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CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

77-18-3.
77-18-8.3.
77-18-8.6.
77-18-10.

Section
Suspension of sentence — Pleas
held in abeyance — Probation
— Supervision — Preaentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
lerms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings — Electronic
monitoring.
Disposition of fines.
Special condition of sentence
during incarceration — Penalty.
Special condition of probation —
Penalty.
Petition — Expungement of

77-18 11.

77-18-12.
77-18-13.
77 18-15.

records of arrest, investigation, and detention — Eligibility conditions — No filing
fee.
Petition — Expungement of
conviction — Certificate of eligibility — Notice - Written
evaluation — Objections —
Hearing.
Grounds for denial of certificate
of eligibility — Effect of prior
convictions.
Hearing — Standard of proof —
Exception.
Retention of expunged records
— Fee — Agencies.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
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(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3Ma) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions df law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4)
by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
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department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of
electronic monitoring;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest
in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines,
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
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(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
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(ii) If t h e defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, t h e
prosecuting a t t o r n e y shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) T h e persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations a r e based shall be presented a s witnesses subject to
questioning by t h e defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) T h e defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and p r e s e n t evidence,
(e) (i) After t h e h e a r i n g t h e court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding t h a t t h e defendant violated t h e conditions of
probation, t h e court may order t h e probation revoked, modified,
continued, or t h a t t h e e n t i r e probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, t h e defendant shall be sentenced or t h e
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed u n d e r this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in b a n k r u p t c y a s
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) T h e court m a y order t h e defendant to commit himself to t h e custody of
the Division of Mental H e a l t h for t r e a t m e n t a t the Utah State Hospital a s a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t of t h e
U t a h S t a t e Hospital or his designee h a s certified to the court t h a t :
(a) the defendant is a p p r o p r i a t e for and can benefit from t r e a t m e n t a t
t h e s t a t e hospital;
(b) t r e a t m e n t space a t t h e hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2Kg) a r e receiving priority for t r e a t m e n t over t h e defendants described in this subsection.
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, a r e classified protected in accordance with Title 6 3 , C h a p t e r 2,
Government Records Access a n d M a n a g e m e n t Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, t h e S t a t e Records Committee may not order t h e
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure a t t h e
time of sentencing p u r s u a n t to this section, the d e p a r t m e n t may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by t h e court p u r s u a n t to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
t h e d e p a r t m e n t for purposes of supervision, confinement, and t r e a t m e n t of
t h e offender;
(c) requested by t h e Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by t h e subject of t h e presentence investigation report or
t h e subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by t h e victim of the crime discussed in t h e presentence
investigation report or t h e victim's authorized representative, provided
t h a t the disclosure to t h e victim shall include only information relating to
s t a t e m e n t s or m a t e r i a l s provided by the victim, to the circumstances of t h e
crime including s t a t e m e n t s by t h e defendant, or to the impact of t h e crime
on t h e victim or t h e victim's household.
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation u n d e r t h e supervision of the department, except a s provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The d e p a r t m e n t shall establish procedures and s t a n d a r d s for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to t h e d e p a r t m e n t in accordance with Subsection (17).
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(17) (a) If t h e court places t h e defendant on probation u n d e r this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of t h e court.
(b) T h e electronic monitoring shall alert t h e d e p a r t m e n t and the
a p p r o p r i a t e law enforcement unit of t h e defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used u n d e r conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to w e a r a n electronic monitoring device a t all
times; and
(ii) t h a t a device be placed in t h e home of t h e defendant, so t h a t the
defendant's compliance with t h e court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
t h r o u g h electronic monitoring a s a condition of probation u n d e r this
section, it shall:
(i) place t h e defendant on probation u n d e r the supervision of the
D e p a r t m e n t of Corrections;
(ii) order the d e p a r t m e n t to place a n electronic monitoring device
on t h e defendant and install electronic monitoring e q u i p m e n t in the
residence of the defendant; a n d
(iii) order the defendant to pay t h e costs associated with home
confinement to t h e d e p a r t m e n t or t h e program provider.
(e) T h e d e p a r t m e n t shall pay t h e costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by t h e court.
(f) T h e d e p a r t m e n t m a y provide t h e electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
History: C. 1953, 7 7 1 8 1 , enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2; 1981, ch. 59, ft 2; 1982, ch.
9, ft 1; 1983, ch. 47, ft 1; 1983, ch. 68, ft 1;
1983, ch. 85, ft 2; 1984, ch. 20, ft 1; 1985, ch.
212, ft 17; 1985, ch. 229, ft 1; 1987, ch. 114,
ft 1; 1989, ch. 226, ft I; 1990, ch. 134, ft 2;
1991, ch. 66, ft 5; 1991, ch. 206,ft6; 1992, ch.
14, ft 3; 1993, ch. 82, ft 7; 1993, ch. 220, ft 3;
1994, ch. 13, ft 24; 1994, ch. 198, ft 1; 1994,
ch. 230, ft 1; 1995, ch. 20, ft 146; 1995, ch.
117,ft2; 1995, ch. 184, ft 1; 1995, ch. 301,ft3;
1995, ch. 337, ft 11; 1995, ch. 352, ft 6; 1996,
ch. 79, ft 103.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment by ch 20. effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Subsections 76-3-201(4) and (5)" for
"Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4)" in Subsection
(HXi)and replaced "Chapter 1" with "Chapter 2"
in Subsection (15).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1995, added references to "interest in
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4)" in
Subsections (5Xc), (8Ki). <9Xa), (lOXaXii), and
(13), deleted a reference to Subsection 76-3201(3) in Subsection (8Xi), corrected a reference
in Subsection (15), and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 184, effective
May 1, 1995, deleted a requirement of a "recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by

the defendant" in Subsection (5XbXii); rewrote
Subsection (6), making significant stylistic
changes, decreasing the time that the presentence investigation must be available before
trial, which had been ten days, and adding the
possibility of a ten-day period to correct inaccuracies in the report; and added "and disbursement" after "collection" in Subsection (9Xa).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective
May 1, 1995, substituted "the recommended
amount of complete restitution" for "pecuniary
damages," inserted "as denned in Subsection
76-3-201(4)" twice and inserted "court-ordered"
in Subsection (5Xa) and rewrote Subsection (9).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective
May 1, 1995, added "which may include the use
of electronic monitoring" at the end of Subsection (8Xf), added Subsections (16) and (17). and
corrected a statutory reference in Subsection
(15).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 352, effective
May 1, 1995, inserted "if the defendant is not
represented by counsel" in the first sentence of
Subsection (6), substituted "protected" for "private" and "Chapter (2)" for "Chapter (1)" in the
first sentence of Subsection (15), added Subsection (15Xe), and made related stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, substituted "protected" for "confidential"
in Subsection (5Xd).
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6
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MAY 2 0 1997

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
\

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Re: Probation Status)

-vsCAPRICE T. MARTIN,
)

Case Nos. 931900803 FS

Defendant.
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for Evidentiary
Hearing and determination of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, regarding an Amended
Affidavit and Order to Show Cause filed against the Defendant in this matter, on May 8. 1997 at
2:00 p.m. The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge, presided. Defendant was present and
was represented by Gregory M. Constantino. The State was represented by Clark A. Harms,
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County.
The Court heard the testimony of Agent Glade Anderson of Adult Probation & Parole; of
Ms. Pat Jones, Clerk for Judge Frank G. Noel; and of the Defendant, Caprice T. Martin. The
Court received into evidence both the original and a copy of the May 16, 1996
Progress/Violation Report, authored by Agent Anderson and filed with the Court on May 26,
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1996, to which was appended the original and a copy, respectively, of Defendant's May 21, 1996
Waiver of Personal Appearance. The Court also received and took notice of the docket record of
this case. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the pleadings and cases which had been
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case. Based
upon the testimony, arguments of counsel and evidence presented, and for good cause shown, the
Court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 25, 1994, Defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Robbery, a

Second Degree Felony, in this Court.
2.

On May 6, 1994, Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 1-15 years in the Utah

State Prison; the execution of each of the imposed sentences was stayed by the Court, and
Defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a
period of eighteen months.
3. On January 6, 1995, Defendant's probation on each of these cases was revoked and
reinstated for an additional eighteen months from January 6, 1995, upon his admission that he
had violated the terms and conditions of such probation.
4. On May 28, 1996, Agent Anderson filed with the Court a Progress/Violation Report
and Defendant's Waiver of Personal Appearance, each of which indicated that Defendant had not
yet completed substance abuse counseling and fine payments, and each of which requested that
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Defendant be granted an extension of twelve months additional probation from July 6, 1996 in
which to complete his probation requirements.
5. On May 28, 1996, Judge Frank G. Noel entered an Order extending Defendant's
probation by signing his initials, and entering the effective date of the Order following the
''Approved and Ordered" language appended to the Progress/Violation Report which requested
said extension.
6. In the hearing on May 8, 1997, this Court heard testimony from, and observed the in
court demeanor, affectation and conduct of Defendant, and finds him to be an intelligent, capable
and reasoned high school graduate, fully cognizant, and demonstrably able to read, write and
understand the English language.
7. On May 21, 1996, Defendant met with Agent Anderson regarding his probation
status, at which meeting, Defendant was presented with the Waiver form.
8. Having previously been subject to an Order to Show Cause proceeding on January 6,
1995, Defendant was fully cognizant of the possibility of his having an Order to Show Cause
filed against him for failing to abide by and complete his probationary conditions, and was fully
aware of the rights, and risks, entailed in an Order to Show Cause proceeding.
9. On May 21, 1996, Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause proceeding would be
initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of Personal Appearance, knew that at an
Order to Show Cause proceeding he would be entitled at all due process and access to counsel
rights available to criminal defendants, knew that he would have the right to admit or deny any
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allegations of such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he would be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing at which the State would have to show, upon the evidence, to a preponderance standard,
that a probation violation had occurred, and he knew that his probation could be revoked and his
original prison sentence entered if a violation was found.
10. On May 21, 1996, Defendant signed the Waiver of Personal Appearance form freely
and voluntarily, knowing that as a result his probation would be extended for an additional
twelve months.
11. The Waiver of Personal Appearance form is clear and unambiguous, is
uncomplicated, and clearly stated that Defendant's probation would be extended for an additional
twelve months from July 6, 1996.
12. Defendant's signature on the Waiver of Personal Appearance indicates he was
looking directly at the Waiver when signed, and had every opportunity to read the Waiver if he
chose to do so.
13. Pursuant to the Progress/Violation Report and the Waiver of Personal Appearance,
Defendant's probation was extended for twelve months, not revoked and reinstated. Because a
waiver and extension occurred, the need for an Order to Show Cause revocation proceeding was
obviated.
14. After Judge Noel signed the original Progress/Violation report, a copy was conformed
by Judge Noel's clerk, Ms. Pat Jones. The conformed copy was placed in the Court's file, and
the original, signed by Judge Noel, was returned to Adult Probation and Parole.
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15. As soon as Judge Noel signed the Progress/Violation Report as "Approved and
Entered", a valid, enforceable Order extending Defendant's probation was in effect.
16. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(12)(a)(i), the filing of the Progress/Violation
Report and the signed Waiver of Personal Appearance commenced the waiver proceedings
necessary to extend Defendant's probation.
17. Waiver proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(12)(a)(i) were thus
commenced on May 28, 1996, over a month before Defendant's previously ordered probationary
period was due to expire.
18. Furthermore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§77-18-l(l l)(b), the May 28, 1996 filing of
the Progress/Violation Report tolled Defendant's probation from that date.
19. A probationer who is waiving his personal appearance and right to an revocation
proceeding in order to have probation extended is not entitled to the same due process rights in
such a waiver as would be accorded to a criminal defendant at a probation violation and
revocation proceeding, in that the possible outcomes of the proceedings are so completely
disparate.
20. Defendant's May 21, 1996 waiver, and Judge Noel's subsequent Order based upon
that wraiver, extended Defendant's probation until July 6, 1997.
FROM THE FORFEGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. On May 21,1996, Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause proceeding would be
initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of Personal Appearance, knew that at an
Order to Show Cause proceeding he would be entitled at all due process and access to counsel
rights available to criminal defendants, knew that he would have the right to admit or deny any
allegations of such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he would be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing at which the State would have to show, upon the evidence, to a preponderance standard,
that a probation violation had occurred, and he knew that his probation could be revoked and his
original prison sentence entered if a violation was found.
2. On May 21, 1996, Defendant signed the Waiver of Personal Appearance form freely
and voluntarily, knowing that as a result his probation would be extended for an additional
twelve months.
3. Defendant's signature on the Waiver of Personal Appearance indicates he was
looking directly at the Waiver when signed, and had every opportunity to read the Waiver if he
chose to do so.
4. Pursuant to the Progress/Violation Report and the Waiver of Personal Appearance,
Defendant's probation was extended for twelve months, not revoked and reinstated. Because a
waiver and extension occurred, the need for an Order to Show Cause revocation proceeding was
obviated.
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5. As soon as Judge Noel signed the Progress/Violation Report as "Approved and
Entered", a valid, enforceable Order extending Defendant's probation was in effect.
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1 (12)(a)(i), the filing of the Progress/Violation
Report and the signed Waiver of Personal Appearance commenced the waiver proceedings
necessary to extend Defendant's probation.
7. Waiver proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(12)(a)(i) were thus
commenced on May 28, 1996, over a month before Defendant's previously ordered probationary
period was due to expire.
8. Furthermore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§77-18-l(l l)(b), the May 28, 1996 filing of
the Progress/Violation Report tolled Defendant's probation from that date.
9. A probationer who is waiving his personal appearance and right to an revocation
proceeding in order to have probation extended is not entitled to the same due process rights in
such a waiver as would be accorded to a criminal defendant at a probation violation and
revocation proceeding, in that the possible outcomes of the proceedings are so completely
disparate.
10. Defendant's May 21, 1996 waiver, and Judge Noel's subsequent Order based upon
that waiver, extended Defendant's probation until July 6, 1997.
11. This Court continues to have jurisdiction over Defendant, and Defendant was, and has
been on probation to this Court at all times since May 28, 1996, up to and including the present
time.
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12. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the probation supervision, and the pending Orders to
Show Cause should be denied
DATED this C^i

day of May, 1997.
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Certificate Of Delivery
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law (Re: Probation Status) was delivered to Gregory M. Constantino,
Attorney for Defendant, at 68 South Main Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the
[ZjL day of May, 1997.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
(Re: Probation Status)

-vsCAPRICE T. MARTIN,
Defendant.

Case Nos. 931900803 FS
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for Evidentiary
Hearing and determination of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, regarding an Amended
Affidavit and Order to Show Cause filed against the Defendant in this matter, on May 8, 1997 at
2:00 p.m. The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge, presided. Defendant was present and
was represented by Gregory M. Constantino. The State was represented by Clark A. Harms,
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County.
The Court heard the testimony of Agent Glade Anderson of Adult Probation & Parole; of
Ms. Pat Jones, Clerk for Judge Frank G. Noel; and of the Defendant, Caprice T. Martin. The
Court received into evidence both the original and a copy of the May 16, 1996
Progress/Violation Report, authored by Agent Anderson and filed with the Court on May 26,
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1996, to which was appended the original and a copy, respectively, of Defendant's May 21, 1996
Waiver of Personal Appearance. The Court also'received and took notice of the docket record of
this case. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the pleadings and cases which had been
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case. Based
upon the testimony, arguments of counsel and evidence presented, and for good cause shown,
having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and based upon those
Findings and Conclusions, the Court now makes and enters the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

This Court continues to have jurisdiction over Defendant, and Defendant was, and

has been on probation to this Court at all times since May 28, 1996, up to and including the
present time.
2. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the probation supervision, and the pending Orders to
Show Cause is denied
DATED this <A , J day of May, 1997.

"HONORABLE LESLUTA. LEWIS
DISTRICT JUDbE.
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Certificate Of Delivery
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order (Re: Probation
Status) was delivered to Gregory M. Constantino, Attorney for Defendant, at 68 South Main
Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the ( ^

probatn.97\findings\martin

day of May, 1997.
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prejudicial to the defendant to correct that clerical
error, if one exists, if this court finds one exists.
Nothing further.
THE COURT:

Unless you have questions.

No, I don't.

It'll be the order

of the court that the motion is denied.
finds that the following facts exist.

This court
I find this based

upon the clear, uncontroverted testimony.
First, that a meeting occurred between the
probation agent, Mr. Glade Anderson, and the defendant,
on or about May 21st of 1996. That at that meeting, the
defendant was presented with a waiver that he ultimately
signed, that he was not shown or given a copy of a PVA,
or progress/violation report, but rather, that the
probation agent, Mr. Anderson, told the defendant that
he wanted to have the defendant extended so that he
could attend substance abuse classes, as ordered by the
judge, and that, further, if the defendant did not do
so, this matter would be taken to the court and the
judge might well require him to be extended and attend
the classes m -any.event.

But •taased upon that

representation^ the defendant signed a waiver.
This*, court finds that the defendant is an
intelligent person, ^ person who has demonstrated in
this court, in this court's-, presence, that intelligence^
and specifically that he has*demonstrated the ability to
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1

read and understand these concepts.

2

That, in addition to having demonstrated

3

intelligence and the ability to read, he also has a high

4

school degree.

5

stranger to the order to show cause process, and that,

6

not only did he have the representation that he has

7

In addition this, defendant is no

J acknowledged from Mr. Anderson, but he also had a

8

history with this court, and by that I mean with the

9

Third District Court, in the same case that we're here

10

on, before this judge, where there was a prior order to

11

show cause back in May of 1994, and also in January of

12

1995.

13

|
In both of those instances, orders to show

14

cause were filed, and the defendant was served with

15

copies of the same, appeared before Judge Noel in

16

connection with the same, had an opportunity, as was

17

pointed out to him, for a hearing in connection with the

18

allegations in those different orders to show cause, and

19

in each instance, the defendant, in court, admitted all

20

or part of the allegations set forth in the affidavits.

21

This court finds that, therefore, the

22

defendant had a knowledge of what would have occurred

23

had he not signed the waiver, that specifically he would

24

have been brought before the judge, would have had an

25

opportunity to admit or, in the Alternative, to deny,
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and that he further knew that if he denied he was
entitled to a hearing.
So the court, this court takes into account,
takes judicial knowledge of the fact that there are two
prior orders to show cause in this same case, and that
on those matters, based upon the court records, the
defendant did, in fact, appear in front of Judge Noel.
Further, this court finds that this is not a
situation where a revocation ever occurred in this last
instance, that is to say on the occasion of the May of
'96 allegations, but rather, an extension occurred
obviating the need for either an order to show cause
hearing, or a formal revocation proceeding.
That the defendant, having been presented
with the waiver document, which, in the body of the
same, in clear, bold-faced print, handwriting,
indicates, "Probation extended twelve months from July
6, '96 for payment of remaining fine balance and
completion of substance abuse counseling."
That document, which is titled "Waiver of
Personal Appearance Before the Court," is not a long
document, it is not a complicated document, it is not a
document full of legalese.

It is a double spaced,

simple, straightforward document, and this court so
finds.
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And this court finds that the defendant has
signed it in a manner indicating by the signature that
when he signed it, it was in front of him, the signature
is not from an angle, it's not upside down, but rather,
and the defendant so acknowledged, was signed by being
placed in front of him, which clearly gave him the
opportunity to read the same, and this court finds that
it would be almost impossible to sign this and not see
the handwritten indication that probation was extended
for twelve months, the time frame at issue, and the
reasons for the extension.
This court finds that, based, again, upon the
defendant's prior appearances, he understood what the
alternative would have besn, and that he had the right
to that alternative process.
The court further finds that an order does
exist in this case, based upon the defendant's waiver,
that that order is a document titled "Progress/Violation
Report," filed in the court's file on or about May 28th
of f96, the last portion of that document constituting
the order.
Specifically the document says, after a
lengthy recitation of the history of this case, and a
recommendation section that says* "It is recommended
that the defendant's probation be extended for an
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additional twelve months from July 6th of '96 to allow
AP and P to retain jurisdiction of the defendant for the
verification of substance abuse counseling and fine
payments," the defendant has agreed to this, and has
signed a waiver.
After that—and the signature of the
probation officer affirming the same—there is a line
that says, "Approved and ordered."
And the court finds, based

upon the testimony

of Ms. Pat Jones, that the judge did, in fact, sign that
on that line where he indicated "approved and ordered,"
that Ms. Jones then conformed the copy that is in the
file, sending the original that has now been marked as
an exhibit back to AP and P.

This, having been marked

as an exhibit, is now before the court, and also will be
made part of the file.

Not to correct anything that

needs to be corrected, but as part of the file.
The court also indicates that if I were to
accept the defense's representation that legally one
cannot waive one's rights unless the proceedings have
been commenced, I would indicate that proceedings had
been commenced in this case with the filing of a
criminal information, et cetera, that there is no need
that a specific order to show cause be filed before one
can waive an appearance at such a hearing.
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In fact, the statute, 77-18-1 is very clear,
and I'm referring to subsection 11-B, or excuse me,
12-A-I, first, which says, "Probation may not be
modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer."

This court finds that that is

precisely what occurred in this case.
The court further finds that counsel for the
state is correct in indicating that 77-18-1-11-B
indicates that the running of the probation period is
tolled upon the filing of a progress/violation report,
and no one has disputed that a PVA was filed in this
case alleging a violation.
The court further finds that the relevant
case law talking about due process talks about a due
process right that, of course, exists when one is
revoked.

Again, this is not a revocation.

This is an

extension, and the two situations are very different,
because in a revocation a defendant is giving up very
important rights, and is before the court in the context
where that individual can have his probation terminated
and can have the original commitment imposed.

I

When someone agrees to an extension, waiving
a hearing, a prison commitment or a commitment on the
original sentence of the court', is not a possibility.
Therefore, the defendant is not facing the same penalty,
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as it were, and the same due process rights do not
attach.
If I were to find otherwise, in essence, I'd
be saying that a defendant can never

waive a

and I do not believe that is the law.

hearing,

I believe, as

long as the waiver is voluntary and intelligent, an
individual can execute such a waiver on a situation
where probation is being extended.
And I believe that the waiver in this case
was voluntary and intelligently made. And again, I base
this upon the statements of the probation agent, and
also upon the defendant's own statements, and further,
based upon my observation of the defendant's appearance
and demeanor, and the fact that he seems to be an
extremely intelligent, confident individual who
obviously can read, and has had the benefit of
education.
And further, I base it upon the other
documents that are parr of the court record and filed,
disclosing that the defendant had the benefit of other
order to show cause proceedings, including appearances
before the court where his rights were explained to him.
Based upon that, I deny the motion.

Is there

anything further we need to set up in this case, or
anything- -

I guess we've got a'further order to show
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